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Nietzsche on Objects
Abstract: Nietzsche was persistently concerned with what an object is and how diff er-
ent views of objects lead to diff erent views of facts, causality, personhood, substance, 
truth, mathematics and logic, and even nihilism. Yet his treatment of objects is incred-
ibly puzzling. In many passages, he assumes that objects such as trees and leaves, 
tables and chairs, and dogs and cats are just ordinary entities of experience. In other 
places, he reports that objects do not exist. Elsewhere he claims that objects exist, 
but as mere bundles of forces. And sometimes he proposes that we bring all objects 
into existence. Nietzsche’s writings, then, appear to support various secondary read-
ings, which are jointly inconsistent. My chief aim is to present and defend the reading 
that Nietzsche embraces constructivism about objects, the neo-Kantian view that all 
objects are socially constructed. I fi rst explain this view and argue that all non-con-
structivist readings are not supported by Nietzsche’s texts. I then present Nietzsche’s 
object constructivism, reconstruct his argument for the position, and defend it from 
an internal objection. I fi nish by suggesting that Nietzsche might have embraced such 
a radical conception of objects because it plays a crucial role in overcoming nihilism.
Keywords: metaphysics, objects, constructivism, science, nihilism.
Zusammenfassung: Nietzsche befasste sich ständig damit, was ein Objekt ist und wie 
verschiedene Sichten auf Objekte zu verschiedenen Sichten auf Tatsachen, Kausalität, 
Persönlichkeit, Substanz, Wahrheit, Mathematik und Logik und sogar auf den Nihilis-
mus führen. Doch seine Behandlung der Objekt-Frage ist unglaublich verwirrend. In 
vielen Passagen nimmt er an, dass Objekte wie Bäume und Blätter, Tische und Stühle, 
Hunde und Katzen schlicht gewöhnliche Erfahrungsgegebenheiten sind. An anderen 
Stellen sagt er, dass Objekte nicht existieren. An wieder anderen Stellen behauptet er, 
dass Objekte existieren, aber nur als Bündel von Kräften. Und manchmal schlägt er vor, 
dass wir es sind, die alle Objekte zur Existenz bringen. So scheinen Nietzsches Schrif-
ten unterschiedliche Interpretationen zu stützen, die miteinander unvereinbar sind. 
Mein Hauptziel ist, die Lesart zu bieten und zu verteidigen, nach der Nietzsche sich in 
Sachen Objekte den Konstruktivismus zu eigen macht, die neokantianische Sicht, dass 
alle Objekte sozial konstruiert sind. Zunächst erläutere ich diese Sicht und zeige, dass 
alle nicht-konstruktivistischen Lesarten keinen Rückhalt in Nietzsches Texten haben. 
Dann lege ich Nietzsches Objekt-Konstruktivismus dar, rekonstruiere seine Argumenta-
tion dafür und verteidige sie gegen einen internen Einwand. Ich schließe mit dem Vor-
schlag, dass Nietzsche sich eine so radikale Konzeption der Objekte zu eigen gemacht 
haben könnte, weil sie eine Schlüsselrolle in der Überwindung des Nihilismus spielt.
Schlagwörter: Metaphysik, Objekte, Konstruktivismus, Wissenschaft, Nihilismus.
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Nietzsche was persistently concerned with what an object is, including how different 
views of objects lead to different views of facts, causality, personhood, substance, 
truth, mathematics and logic, and even nihilism.¹ Yet his treatment of objects is per-
plexing. In many passages, he assumes that objects such as trees and leaves, tables 
and chairs, and dogs and cats are just ordinary entities we commonly experience. In 
other places, he reports that objects are “erroneous articles of faith” [“irrthümliche 
Glaubenssätze”] (GS 110). Elsewhere, he claims that objects are mere “complexes of 
events” [“Complexe des Geschehens”] (Nachlass 1887, 9[91]). And sometimes he sug-
gests we have the power to bring objects into being: “in the long run it is enough to 
create new names and valuations and probabilities in order to create new ‘things’”² 
(GS 58, translation modified).
These passages support opposing readings. Some commentators believe Nietz-
sche is a common sense realist who thinks objects are ordinary entities that exist 
independently of our minds.³ Others defend the eliminativist interpretation that for 
Nietzsche objects do not exist.⁴ Nietzsche appears to embrace a fundamental ontology 
of bundles of forces, uniformly described as “will to power,” which is incompatible 
with the existence of objects. Other interpreters off er a revisionary reading, according 
1 See TL; HH I: 11, 19; GS 57, 58, 110; BGE 12, 16, 17, 21; GM III: 12, 24; TI “Reason” 2, 5, “Errors” 3; 
Nachlass 1885, 34[131], 1885, 35[35], 1885, 36[21], 1885, 36[23], 1885/86, 1[28], 1885/86, 2[77], 1885/86, 
2[87], 1885/86, 2[139], 1885/86, 2[149], 1885/86, 2[150], 1885/86, 2[152], 1886/87, 5[19], 1886/87, 6[11], 
1886/87, 7[48], 1886/87, 7[54], 1886/87, 7[63], 1887, 9[91], 1887, 9[97], 1887, 10[202], 1887/88, 11[73], 
1887/88, 11[120], 1888, 14[79], 1888, 14[98], 1888, 14[122]. This essay focuses on Nietzsche’s view of 
material objects. I use the following translations and abbreviations of Friedrich Nietzsche’s texts: 
Antichrist, in: Walter Kaufmann (Ed., Trans.), The Portable Nietzsche, New York 1976, pp. 565–656; 
Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufmann (Trans.), New York 1989; Daybreak, Maudemarie Clark / 
Brian Leiter (Eds.), R. J. Hollingdale (Trans.), Cambridge 1997; Human, all too Human, R. J. Hollingdale 
(Trans.), Cambridge 1996; On the Genealogy of Morals, Walter Kaufmann (Trans.), New York 1989; The 
Gay Science, Bernard Williams (Ed.), Josefine Nauckhoff (Trans.), Cambridge 2001; Thus Spoke Zara-
thustra, in: Kaufmann (Ed.), The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 121–439; Twilight of the Idols, Duncan Large 
(Trans.), Oxford 1998; On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense, in: Daniel Breazeale (Ed., Trans.), Phi-
losophy and Truth, Amherst 1979, pp. 79–100; Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann (Ed.), R. J. Hollingdale 
(Trans.), New York 1968.
2 “[…] es genügt, neue Namen und Schätzungen und Wahrscheinlichkeiten zu schaffen, um auf die 
Länge hin neue „Dinge“ zu schaffen”.
3 See Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, Cambridge 1990. See also Brian Leiter, 
Nietzsche on Morality, New York 2002; and Brian Leiter, Perspectivism in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of 
Morals, in: Richard Schacht (Ed.), Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Ge-
nealogy of Morals, Berkeley 1994.
4 See Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, New York 1965; Robert Nola, Nietzsche’s Theory of 
Truth and Belief, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1987), pp. 552–557; Robert Nola, 
Nietzsche’s Naturalism: Science and Belief, in: Babette Babich / Robert Cohen (Eds.), Nietzsche, Epis-
temology, and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht 1999; George Stack, Nietzsche’s Anthropic Circle: 
Man, Science, and Myth, Rochester 2005; Lee Braver, A Thing of This World: A History of Continental 
Anti-Realism, Evanston 2007.
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to which Nietzsche thinks objects are identical to bundles of forces. One version of this 
reading, call it unifi cationism, holds that objects are intrinsically organized bundles 
of forces.⁵ Objects such as trees and tables are particular collections of forces with 
internally unifi ed structures. An opposing version of the revisionary reading, call it 
constructivism, claims that objects are bundles of forces that human beings interpret 
to be objects.⁶ Trees and tables are bundles of forces we take to be trees and tables.
I argue that Nietzsche embraces constructivism. I fi rst introduce what it means to 
be a constructivist about objects. Aft erward, I argue that the non-constructivist read-
ings are not supported by Nietzsche’s texts.⁷ I then present Nietzsche’s constructiv-
ism, reconstruct his argument for the position, and defend it from a major objection 
internal to his philosophical program. I close by off ering a surprising reason for why 
Nietzsche might have been attracted to such a controversial view of objects: it seems 
to play an important role in overcoming nihilism.
Object Constructivism and Object Objectivism
Constructivism about objects is a form of social constructivism.⁸ Ordinarily, it ap-
pears that something is constructed if its existence depends on intentional activity, 
5 See John Richardson, Nietzsche’s System, Oxford 1996; Stephan Hales / Rex Welshon, Nietzsche’s 
Perspectivism, Urbana / Chicago 2000; Tsarina Doyle, Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics, 
Edinburgh 2009.
6 See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Harvard 1985; Lanier Anderson, Truth and 
Objectivity in Perspectivism, in: Synthese 115 (1998), pp. 1–32, and Lanier Anderson, Overcoming 
Charity: the Case of Maudemarie Clark’s Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, in: Nietzsche-Studien 25 
(1996), pp. 307–341; Christoph Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation, Berkeley 1999.
7 This essay uses material from Nietzsche’s notebooks. Of course, any reading that relies too heavily 
on such material is suspect as an interpretation of Nietzsche’s considered view. Accordingly, some 
commentators disregard the Nachlass (see Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy). And yet, others 
rely on it substantially (see Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, New York 1983; Peter Poellner, Nietzsche 
and Metaphysics, Oxford 1996; Richardson, Nietzsche’s System 1996; Hales / Welshon, Nietzsche’s 
Perspectivism 2000; Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, Harvard 2006; Doyle, Nietzsche on 
Epistemology and Metaphysics). It is clear that the unpublished writings contain many of Nietzsche’s 
most interesting thoughts on metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and nihilism. Plus, 
unlike published writings, many notebook entries contain relatively straightforward philosophical 
arguments free of rhetoric, hyperbole, metaphor, and other literary devices. Moreover, unpublished 
work often develops published work in great detail. In particular, published passages that claim that 
objects are constructed are expounded on at great length in the notebooks. For these reasons, it seems 
worthwhile to use the Nachlass for this project.
8 Object constructivism is typically associated with William James and Nelson Goodman. See William 
James, Pragmatism, Bruce Kuklick (Ed.), Indianapolis 1981, pp. 109–120; Nelson Goodman, Ways of 
Worldmaking, Indianapolis 1978. Nietzsche was familiar with constructivism through the influence of 
Kant and the neo-Kantians.
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and something is socially constructed if it is constructed by a group of intentional 
agents.⁹ Many objects are obviously socially constructed, such as tables and chairs, 
but constructivists make the much stronger claim that seemingly natural objects, 
such as quarks and stars, are also constructed. In general, object constructivism is 
the thesis that all objects we can in principle encounter are socially constructed. To 
say objects are socially constructed is to say the identity conditions of objects are es-
sentially dependent on our intentional activities, which is to say those activities are 
partly constitutive of the identity of objects.¹⁰ The intentional activities signifi cant to 
constructivists are certain kinds of descriptive representations, such as those found 
in the sciences, since these appear to explain how objects are constructed.¹¹ Object 
constructivism, therefore, is the thesis that the identity conditions of all objects we 
can in principle encounter are essentially dependent on certain kinds of descriptive 
representations. To illustrate, consider Scrabble jokers, the blank tiles that can be 
used to represent any letter of the alphabet in the game of Scrabble. For the construc-
tivist, if a tile a is a Scrabble joker while b is not, it is because the concept Scrabble 
joker fi xes the conditions of identity of being a Scrabble joker such that the concept 
correctly applies to a but not b – perhaps, for instance, because b is not a blank tile, 
but has the marking “Z10.”¹²
Constructivists do not believe objects have identity conditions solely in virtue 
of being actually represented. If identity conditions depended on actual representa-
tion, then if there had been no people there would have been no objects such as 
stars or dinosaurs. But it certainly seems that there would have been such objects. 
Constructivists hold that objects gain conditions of identity by virtue of the possibil-
ity of being represented in some way or another.¹³ They only deny that objects have 
identity conditions regardless of the possibility of being represented. Thus, it makes 
sense to talk about objects we have not encountered. If there had been no people 
there would still have been the things that would be constructed by humans were 
they around.
Object objectivism is the thesis that not all objects are socially constructed. The 
identities of some objects exist independently of our intentional activities. For the 
objectivist, the identity conditions of objects exist at least constitutively, and per-
haps, but not typically, conditionally independent of our actions. If an object’s iden-
tity conditions are conditionally dependent on our actions, then although we must 
9 See Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge, Oxford 2006, p. 16.
10 See Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking; Robert Schwartz, I’m Going to Make You a Star, in: Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy 6 (1986), pp. 427–438, and Starting from Scratch: Making Worlds, in: Erkenntnis 
52 (2000), pp. 151–159.
11 See Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge, pp. 27–28.
12 This example is treated at length in Schwartz, I’m Going to Make you a Star.
13 For a formulation of this idea, see Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer / Allen 
Wood (Ed., Trans.), Cambridge 1998, A 496/B 524-A 497/B 525.
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understand what that object is from some standpoint or other determined by our ac-
tivities, the object’s identity is not constituted by those activities.¹⁴ Grasping what 
objects are stars, for instance, might require us to be in some cognitive relation to the 
fi rmament, but objectivists hold that such a relation does not constitute what objects 
are stars. Objectivists who maintain that the identity conditions of objects exist both 
constitutively and conditionally independent of our actions embrace the existence 
of noumenal objects. Noumenal objects are objects in principle inaccessible to hu-
man beings, such as Kantian things in themselves. Whether objectivists believe the 
identity conditions of objects exist only constitutively independent of our actions, or 
both constitutively and conditionally independent of our actions, objectivism holds 
that objects have some identifying features that in no way depend on our activities, 
while constructivism denies that objects have such features. This is the fundamental 
diff erence between the two theses.
Non-Constructivist Readings
What is Nietzsche’s position on objects? To begin, consider common sense realism.¹⁵ 
This view is off ered by Maudemarie Clark and supported by Brian Leiter. It is a con-
sequence of Clark’s developmental interpretation of Nietzsche’s view of truth. She 
argues that between Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and On The Genealogy of Morals 
(1887) Nietzsche rejects his early commitment to the view that all our beliefs are 
false – a view that depends on the position that we cannot know anything about the 
objects that give rise to perceptual states, but only the perceptual states themselves – 
and comes to hold that we can have true beliefs about the objects of experience. The 
later Nietzsche accepts a theory of truth that assumes a particular view of objecthood: 
true beliefs correspond to mind-independent, ordinary objects of experience.¹⁶
14 See Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2nd ed., Princeton, 1997, pp. 15–16: “An object has objective 
existence, in some sense, if it exists and has its nature whatever we believe, think, or can discover: it 
is independent of the cognitive activities of the mind […]. It is not constituted by our knowledge, by our 
epistemic values, by our capacity to refer to it, by our imposition of concepts, theories, or languages.”
15 Common sense realism and unificationism seem compatible with one another. Unificationism 
might be understood as giving an ontologically basic description of ordinary objects. But an argument 
against one of these readings will not necessarily undermine other. Those who defend common sense 
realism deny that Nietzsche is committed to a bundle of forces ontology. See Clark, Nietzsche on Truth 
and Philosophy, Ch. 7; Maudemarie Clark / David Dudrick, The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and 
Evil, Cambridge 2012, Ch. 8; Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, p. 252. Thus, common sense realism could 
be true, but unificationism false. The reverse holds as well. Perhaps Nietzsche does not regard intrin-
sically organized bundles as ordinary objects.
16 See Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, p. 31, 40, 107, 121. The following page numbers refer 
to this book.
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Common sense realism is an objectivist position. Clark writes that, on Nietzsche’s 
account, “the world exists independently of our representations of it” (p. 40), which 
partly means objects exist “ontologically […] distinct from knowers and their rep-
resentations” (p. 45). For Nietzsche, Clark claims, an object has “existence in itself,” 
but not “essence in itself” (p. 136). An object with “essence in itself” has “an essence or 
nature that is independent of what it can appear to be [viz., a thing in itself],” whereas 
an object with “existence in itself” is just an “independently existing thing” (pp. 136–7, 
brackets added). For Clark, Nietzsche’s assertion that “there is only a perspective see-
ing, only a perspective ‘knowing’” (GM III: 12) means that making claims about inde-
pendently existing objects depends on our perspectival actions. In my terminology, 
the common sense realist reading unfolds as follows. Nietzsche rejects the construc-
tivist view that the identity conditions of objects are ontologically dependent on our 
representations of them. He also denies the Kantian objectivist position that the iden-
tity conditions of objects exist both conditionally and constitutively independent of 
our mode of cognition. Instead, Nietzsche accepts the objectivist view that the identity 
conditions of objects are conditionally dependent on our intentional actions.¹⁷ I fully 
agree that Nietzsche denies Kantian objectivism, and I develop this argument below. 
However, I also contend that Nietzsche is not sympathetic to any form of objectivism. 
This will provide suffi  cient reason to think Nietzsche rejects common sense realism.
Although some passages in Nietzsche’s corpus seem to assume that objects are 
ordinary entities, others suggest that he endorses the eliminativist view that there are 
no objects. For instance, Nietzsche declares that “there is no ‘thing’” (HH I: 19; see 
also GS 110; TI, “Reason” 2, 5; Nachlass 1888, 14[79]). Robert Nola’s reconstruction of 
Nietzsche’s argument for eliminativism is as follows:¹⁸
A1. All objects are substances, or are bits of substantive matter, with identity condi-
tions.
A2. Anything which is a nexus of force-power (NFP) has no identity conditions.
A3. So a NFP cannot be a substance, or substantive matter.
A4. The only thing which exists is the total set of NFPs.
A5. So there are no substances or bits of substantive matter with identity conditions.
A6. So there are no objects.
The relevant premises to examine are A1, A2, and A4. Nola justifies A4 by taking 
Nietzsche at his word when he asserts that the world is “‘will to power’ and nothing 
else” (BGE 36). I will grant this premise, set A1 aside, and challenge A2. According to 
Nola, Nietzsche embraces A2 because if the world is will to power, then it consists in 
17 See also Leiter, Perspectivism in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, pp. 349–350.
18 Nola, Nietzsche’s Naturalism, p. 93. See also Nola, Nietzsche’s Theory of Truth and Belief, pp. 552–
567. Those who attribute eliminativism to Nietzsche often endorse some form of this argument.
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“nexuses of force-power (NFP),” or bundles of forces, which implies that “nothing 
has any continuing identity.”¹⁹ Nola cites Nietzsche to support his reading: “Contin-
ual transition forbids us to speak of ‘individuals’ etc.: the ‘number’ of beings is itself 
in flux” (Nachlass 1885, 36[23]). Nietzsche seems to scare-quote ‘individuals’ and 
‘number’ because he rejects the existence of objects.
The passage Nola cites, however, does not support eliminativism. For starters, 
Nietzsche’s claim about numbers mentions that “beings” exist in a world of bundles 
of forces. To assess Nietzsche’s statement about individuals, consider more of the pas-
sage:
The principle of identity has as its background the “appearance” that things are the same. 
A world of becoming could not, in a strict sense, be “grasped” or “known”; only to the extent that 
the “grasping” and “knowing” intellect encounters a coarse, already created world […] is there 
anything like “knowledge” (Nachlass 1885, 36[23]).²⁰
A “world in a state of becoming,” or what Nola regards as a world of bundles of forces, 
cannot be “known” only if knowledge requires a world that is not “already created.” 
A “created” world is one where the way things are depends on our actions. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to suppose that “continual transition” only “forbids us to speak of 
‘individuals’” that exist apart from our actions. Nietzsche also suggests that we can 
apply “the principle of identity” that “things are the same” if that principle refers to 
entities within an “already created world.” Hence, it appears that “individuals” can 
have identity conditions within a world of bundles of forces if such conditions depend 
on our actions. In the following section, I explain Nietzsche’s argument for this view. 
The passage, then, does not support A2, the claim that bundles of forces have no iden-
tity conditions – and, to my knowledge, no other passage does. As a result, Nietzsche 
is not committed to the eliminativist conclusion in A6.²¹
19 Nola, Nietzsche’s Naturalism, p. 93. There is a problem in Nola’s presentation. A2, which reads, 
“Anything which is a nexus of force-power (NFP) has no identity conditions,” is not equivalent to 
the view that since everything is in a “state of flux,” then “nothing has any continuing identity.” A2 
denies that objects have identity conditions simpliciter, while Nola’s explanation of his premise only 
denies that objects have identity conditions over time. The former is the stronger claim. I concentrate 
on showing how Nietzsche resists it.
20 I have omitted what is inessential for my argument. One might contend that Nietzsche criticizes 
constructivism in those omissions. The “already-created world,” he says, is “cobbled together out of 
deceptions.” This suggests that knowledge of a constructed world necessarily involves falsification. 
But this is not a problem. Nietzsche thinks construction requires simplifying the world, and although 
simplifications are literally falsifications, they can also be accurate, or true. For discussion, see Justin 
Remhof, Overcoming the Conflict of Evolutionary and Naturalized Epistemology in Nietzsche, in: His-
tory of Philosophy Quarterly 32.2 (2015), pp. 181–194.
21 The other passages that seem to support eliminativism bear mentioning. These are Nachlass 1888, 
14[79], GS 110, and TI, “Reason” 2 and 5. In the 1888 notebook entry, Nietzsche says, “no things remain 
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Finally, consider unifi cationism. Unifi cationism, like constructivism, holds that 
objects are identical to bundles of forces. Unlike constructivism, though, unifi ca-
tionism is the position that objects are identical to intrinsically organized bundles of 
forces. Support for unifi cationism can be found in Nietzsche’s notebooks. Nietzsche 
discusses
this necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every center of force – and not only man – con-
strues all the rest of the world from its own viewpoint, i.e. measures, feels, forms, according to 
its own force – […] My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and 
to extend its force (– its will to power:) […] But it continually encounters similar efforts on the 
part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement (“union”) with those of them that are 
sufficiently related to it (Nachlass 1888, 14[186]).
A “center of force” has “its own viewpoint” and can form a “‘union’” with other 
centers that are intrinsically similar. Bundles of forces, then, seem to have internally 
unifi ed conditions of identity.
Stephen Hales and Rex Welshon, and more recently Tsarina Doyle, argue for uni-
fi cationism in part by contesting the rival constructivist reading.²² They point out that 
Nietzsche writes, “Where a certain unity obtains in the grouping of things, one has 
always posited spirit as the cause of this coordination: for which notion there is no 
ground whatever […] there is no ground whatever for ascribing to spirit the proper-
ties of organization and systematization (Nachlass 1888, 14[144]). It appears that our 
intentional activity, or “spirit,” cannot organize bundles of forces into objects. So, 
Nietzsche must reject constructivism.
The quotation, however, omits something crucial. It is taken from The Will to 
Power 526, but that passage is only the fi rst half of a single notebook entry, Nachlass 
1888, 14[144], which continues with The Will to Power 523. Here is the context of 
Nietzsche’s remarks in The Will to Power 526:
but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta.” However, a quick 
glance at the context of the passage shows that Nietzsche does not reject the existence of objects, but 
only material atoms, which have been thought to comprise fundamental reality. This helps explain 
Nietzsche’s remark in The Gay Science that “things” are an error (GS 110). Objects are an “error” be-
cause we mistake them to be fundamentally material. The basic nature of the world is not “matter” 
(GS 109), Nietzsche says, but “chaos” (GS 109), “flux” (GS 111), or “becoming” (GS 112). This position 
is likely adopted from Boscovich (see note 26), about whom Nietzsche speaks highly when prepar-
ing The Gay Science for publication (see Nietzsche’s letter to Peter Gast, March 20th, 1882). Last, in 
TI, “Reason” 2 and 5, Nietzsche does not deny objects altogether, but only objects conceived as sub-
stances, that is, objects conceived as having ultimately unchanging natures. The subject-predicate 
structure of grammar leads us to think that what exists are objects (subjects) with natures that persist 
through different phases (predicates).
22 See Hales / Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, p. 71; Doyle, Nietzsche on Epistemology and Meta-
physics, p. 177.
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Where a certain unity obtains in the grouping of things, one has always posited spirit as the 
cause of this coordination: for which notion there is no ground whatever […] We shall be on our 
guard against explaining purposiveness in terms of spirit: there is no ground whatever for ascrib-
ing to spirit the properties of organization and systematization. The nervous system 
has a much more extensive domain; the world of consciousness is added to it. Con-
sciousness plays no role in the total process of adaptation and systematization. 
The Will to Power 523, the second half of the notebook entry, contextualizes those 
remarks:
Nothing is more erroneous than to make of psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, 
the two revelations of one and the same substance. Nothing is explained thereby: the concept 
‘substance” is perfectly useless as an explanation […] We lack any sensitive organs for this inner 
world [i.e. consciousness], so we sense a thousandfold complexity as a unity; so we introduce 
causation where any reason for motion and change remains invisible to us – the sequence of 
thoughts and feelings is only their becoming-visible in consciousness. That this sequence has 
anything to do with a causal chain is completely unbelievable: consciousness has never fur-
nished us with an example of cause and effect [my brackets].
Although the beginning of The Will to Power 526 appears to attack constructivism, it 
is obvious that the notebook passage is not aimed at discussing the conditions un-
der which a bundle of force becomes an object. Nietzsche is concerned with the in-
signifi cant role the Kantian categories of substance and causation play for unifying 
multiplicities in consciousness. It strains the text to read the passage as a rejection of 
constructivism.
In the Nachlass, Nietzsche actually presents an argument against unifi cationism 
and for constructivism. He writes, “That things possess qualities in themselves, irre-
spective of interpretation and subjectivity, is a perfectly idle hypothesis: it would pre-
suppose that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential.”²³ Nietzsche models an 
object with “qualities in itself” on a Kantian thing in itself, or an object with intrinsic 
properties. In this case, F is an intrinsic property of any object a if and only if a’s hav-
ing (or not having) F is ontologically independent of the existence, and of the non-ex-
istence, of any contingent b such that a is wholly distinct from b.²⁴ Unifi cationism 
holds that objects have intrinsic properties. In the passage, however, Nietzsche indi-
cates that the properties of an object that determine its identity are essentially de-
pendent on our interpretations. Specifi cally, F’s being (or not being) a property of a is 
ontologically dependent on the existence, and of the non-existence, of our interpretive 
23 “Daß die Dinge eine B e s c h a f f e n h e i t  a n  s i c h  haben, ganz abgesehen von der Interpretation 
und Subjektivität, ist e i n e  g a n z  m ü s s i g e  H y p o t h e s e : es würde voraussetzen, daß das I n -
t e r p r e t i r e n  u n d  S u b j e k t i v - s e i n  n i c h t  wesentlich sei” (Nachlass 1887, 9[40], KSA 12.353).
24 See also Nachlass 1885/86, 2[85], 1887, 10[202], 1885/86, 2[149]; George Molnar, Powers: A Study in 
Metaphysics, ed. by Steven Mumford, Oxford 2003, pp. 39–40.
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actions. If so, then the properties an object has (if any) essentially independent of our 
interpretive actions fail to constitute its conditions of identity. Consequentially, intrin-
sic properties (if any) fail to constitute an object’s conditions of identity. This explains 
why Nietzsche says that positing intrinsic features is an “idle hypothesis.” The passage 
is good evidence that Nietzsche prefers constructivism to unifi cationism.
The second problem with unifi cationism turns on the fact that, for Nietzsche, 
bundles of forces are constituted by their contextual relations with all other bundles. 
Call this view Contextual Constitution. Those who take seriously Nietzsche’s funda-
mental ontology must hold that he embraces this position. He remarks, for exam-
ple, “[a bundle’s] essence lies in [its] relation to all other [bundles]” (Nachlass 1888, 
14[79], cf. 1888, 14[153], 1888, 14[154]).²⁵ Every bundle depends on, and is depended 
on by, every other bundle. Yet, every bundle depends on, and is depended on by, 
some bundles more than others. “An atom of force,” Nietzsche says, is more “con-
cerned” with relations to other forces in its own “neighborhood” than its distant re-
lations (Nachlass 1885, 36[20]). What unifi cationist readers fail to acknowledge is the 
importance of our being in local relations with bundles. For Nietzsche, properties are 
the result of interacting bundles of forces.²⁶ And he proclaims that “A thing = its qual-
ities; but these equal everything which matters to us about that thing; a unity under 
which we collect the relations that may be of some account to us.”²⁷ Something’s be-
ing an object is defi ned in terms of having properties and we play an essential role in 
determining which properties things have. Contextual Constitution, therefore, entails 
that subjects are responsible for the existence of objects. This is strong reason to favor 
the constructivist reading.
Although unifi cationism seems to enjoy textual support, it does not capture 
Nietzsche’s considered position. Despite its problems, though, it would not be in-
correct to say that, on Nietzsche’s account, when we set out to construct objects we 
confront various structures that must ultimately be due to bundles of forces having 
formed relatively stable internally unifi ed arrangements independently of our actions. 
It is likely that objects are constructed from bundles of forces that exhibit some de-
gree of internal unifi cation. Indeed, intrinsic organization can, and oft en does, limit 
the conditions under which we interpret some collection of forces to be an object. 
25 I substitute “bundle” for “quanta” [Quanta].
26 See Nachlass 1885/86, 2[85], 1888, 14[184], 1888, 14[93], 1888, 14[79]). Nietzsche’s view of proper-
ties reflects the influence of Roger Boscovich. Boscovich opposes the Newtonian idea that fundamen-
tal reality is composed of hard, extended atoms by arguing that non-extended physical force-points 
(“puncta”) are the ultimate constituents of matter. Boscovich tries to show that the relative positions 
and velocities of force-points, together with a complex law of force, can account for all properties of 
matter.
27 “Ein Ding = seine Eigenschaften: diese aber gleich allem, was u n s  an diesem Dinge a n g e h t : 
eine Einheit, unter die wir die für uns in B e t r a c h t  k o m m e n d e n  Relationen zusammenfassen.” 
(Nachlass 1885/86, 2[77], KSA 12.97 f.)
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Nietzsche simply denies that the internal unifi cation of a bundle of forces constitutes 
objecthood – that requires construction.
Nietzsche and Object Constructivism
I have already presented evidence that suggests Nietzsche is a constructivist of some 
kind. It is “we who created the ‘thing’” (Nachlass 1887, 9[144]), he exclaims, and “it 
is enough to create new names and valuations […] in order to create new ‘things’” 
(GS 58). Nietzsche appears to scare-quote ‘thing’ because he holds the unusual posi-
tion that something’s being an object depends on our activities.²⁸
For Nietzsche, “A ‘thing’ is the sum of its eff ects, synthetically united by a con-
cept, an image.”²⁹ The idea of synthetic unity by a concept is distinctly Kantian. Kant 
holds that sense data is presented to us in an undiff erentiated manner. Unifying 
that data to represent objects requires structure provided by an a priori conceptual 
framework. Thus, as Henry Allison phrases it, “an object is by its very nature some-
thing represented.”³⁰ Nietzsche is clearly sympathetic to Kant’s view that objects are 
structured through the application of concepts that organize the world. Unlike Kant, 
however, Nietzsche thinks all concepts are formed exclusively in relation to our con-
tingent needs, interests, and values.³¹ Objects are constructed when we construct 
and employ concepts that organize what Nietzsche calls “eff ects,” or properties that 
derive from interacting bundles of forces. Thus, we construct objects by developing 
concepts that unify collections of properties in relation to our concerns. The identity 
conditions of objects are determined by the set of properties over which our concepts 
generalize. We also play a role in constructing properties, since properties can be en-
tities predicated by concepts.³² For Nietzsche, then, the collection of properties some 
concept C organizes determines the application conditions of the property predicated 
by C, and the identity conditions of C’s target are determined by which collection of 
properties constitute the correct application conditions of the property predicated by 
C. Application conditions are conditions that apply to our concepts, which predicate 
28 When explaining Nietzsche’s constructivism below, I will not follow Nietzsche in flagging ‘object’ 
to mark its unusual, constructivist meaning. It will emerge that for him the constructivist conception 
of an object should be the everyday one.
29 “[E]in „Ding“ ist eine Summe seiner Wirkungen, synthetisch gebunden durch einen Begriff, 
Bild …” (Nachlass 1888, 14[98], KSA 13.275).
30 Henry Allison, An Introduction to the Problem, and: Transcendental Realism and Transcendental 
Idealism, from Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Chapters 1 & 2, in: Patricia Kitcher (Ed.), Kant’s Cri-
tique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays, Lanham / Boulder / New York / Toronto / Oxford 1998, p. 211.
31 See, e.g., Nachlass 1887, 9[98].
32 See Nachlass 1885/86, 2[152].
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properties, and identity conditions govern the objects (if any) those concepts refer to. 
Application conditions fi x the conditions of identity for anything that meets them.³³
Consider planets to help illustrate Nietzsche’s position. What holds for planets 
should extend to his examples, such as mammals (TL) or mountains (GS 57). Let α, β, 
γ … be all the astronomical objects in the universe. Astronomical objects are physical 
entities, associations, or structures that the astronomical sciences take to exist celes-
tially, such as planets, moons, stars, or entire galaxies. Let Ap be the set comprised of 
all the planets, and A1 to An be all simple combinatorial sets of astronomical objects 
(e.g. A6 might contain α, γ; A14 only β). Only one combinatorial set of astronomical 
objects (e.g. A18) is identical to Ap. Each member of a set instantiates a property that is 
unique to members of that set, and that property has those members as its extension.
Suppose we want to know whether α is a planet. Only knowing which astronom-
ical objects (α, β, γ …) are members of which sets (A1 to An) will not answer the ques-
tion. To answer the question we must know which set includes only instances of the 
property of being a planet. According to the International Astronomical Union (IAU), 
α is an instance of the property of being a planet just in case α (i) orbits our sun, (ii) 
has exhibits hydrostatic equilibrium, or has a nearly round shape, and (iii) does not 
have any bodies of comparable size other than its own satellites under its gravita-
tional infl uence. The IAU established (iii) aft er discovering an object larger than Pluto 
that they did not want to induct into Ap, primarily because doing so required adopting 
a defi nition of planet based merely on size, which was, for various reasons, thought 
to be inadequate. Accepting the third condition, however, required reclassifying Pluto 
from planet to dwarf planet. Pluto shares a good portion of its gravitational orbit with 
large Kuiper belt objects, and so it does not satisfy (iii). Hence, Pluto is not a planet.
Nietzsche would interpret Pluto’s reclassifi cation to be the result of a change in 
theoretical commitments about what constitutes the relevant interpretation of the 
conditions under which something counts as a planet. The relevant interpretation 
is crucial because, recall, “A thing = its qualities; but these equal everything which 
matters to us about that thing; a unity under which we collect the relations that may 
be of some account to us” (Nachlass 1885/86, 2[77]). The set of conditions that consti-
tute what objects are planets are the conditions relevant to us about what objects are 
planets. Those conditions form the application conditions of the property of being 
a planet. In doing so, they provide a framework for saying whether or not the term 
‘planet’ applies to particular portions of the world.
On Nietzsche’s account, α is an instance of the property of being a planet just in 
case astronomers decide that our concept planet refers to something that satisfi es 
(i)-(iii), only something that satisfi es (i)-(iii) is the referent of planet, and α satisfi es 
(i)-(iii). Fixing the boundary conditions of planet determines what is a member of AP , 
or, for example, that A14 but not A2 will be identical to Ap. It is not the case that α is or is 
33 See Amie Thomasson, Ordinary Objects, Oxford 2007, pp. 55–62.
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not a member of the set of all planets absent some criteria for what does and does not 
satisfy the membership conditions of that set. Nietzsche states that “‘This is consid-
ered to be’ is the real ‘This is’” (Nachlass 1885/86, 2[150]). Without a set of conditions 
to form the application conditions for the property of being a planet, there is no set 
of objects that are instances of that property. The identity conditions of planets are 
constitutively dependent on our actions because our representations determine the 
correct application conditions of the property of being a planet.
For Nietzsche, there is no ontologically signifi cant diff erence between planets and 
other objects of experience. Presumably, then, a similar argument can be employed 
for explaining how any object that we can encounter is constructed. Nietzsche’s argu-
ment for object constructivism can be reconstructed as follows:
B1. Properties of all objects that are in principle graspable are essentially dependent 
on our interpretive activities.
B2. Properties of objects determine the identity conditions of objects.
B3. So, the identity conditions of all objects that are in principle graspable are essen-
tially dependent on our interpretive activities.
The fact that objects exemplify some collection of properties depends on our organi-
zational activities. Identity conditions depend on us because collections of properties 
determine such conditions. Of course, this argument is not obviously sound. It could 
be argued that Nietzsche denies B1. He appears to think some properties of objects 
exist independently of our actions, such as the property of being the object to which 
we apply the property of being a planet. Before addressing this objection, first con-
sider Nietzsche’s view of what constrains construction.
On Nietzsche’s account, there are constraints on the constructive process. These 
constraints guide acceptable inquiry. Embracing them allows his account to avoid the 
position that constructing objects depends on the whims of particular subjects and 
the view that all constructions are epistemically equal. Most importantly, construc-
tion must be constrained by information from the senses.³⁴ Sensory information is not 
subjective and it should not be ignored when arranging the world some way rather 
than another. What we take to exist is what aff ects us: “we construe ‘what is’ as what 
exerts an eff ect on us, what proves itself by exerting its eff ect.”³⁵ Sense data, however, 
does not itself constrain organization in any unique manner. We arrange what aff ects 
34 See BGE 134; TI “Reason” 3. For Nietzsche the sensory information we cognize is always al-
ready organized to some extent by our concepts and valuations. He indicates that conceptual and 
valuational discriminations are present “in every experience, in every sense impression” (GS 57, 
cf. Nach lass 1887, 9[144], 1885, 34[167], 1885, 34[247], 1885/86, 2[95], 1885, 38[10], 1885, 40[15]; TL; BGE 
192).
35 “Das „Seiende“ wird also von uns gefaßt als das auf u n s  Wirkende, das d u r c h  s e i n  W i r k e n 
S i c h - B e w e i s e n d e .” (Nachlass 1886/87, 5[19], KSA 12.192).
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us in relation to our purposes: “the concept ‘really, truly there’ is one we drew out of 
the ‘mattering-to-us’.”³⁶ The various ways in which sensory information relates to our 
interests infl uences object construction.
Other constraints guide construction as well. These include the current body 
of accepted beliefs, certain epistemic values, such as consistency, scope, and a cer-
tain kind of utility, and the mathematical and logical constraints of self-identity and 
equivalence. These constraints, taken together with sensory information, ensure ob-
jectivity. Nietzsche denies that objectivity requires representing a world constitutively 
independent of our representations of it.³⁷ The “knowledge-seeker” is “in no way an 
observer, outside, indiff erent, secure, objective” (GS 351). We can assess representa-
tions only in relation to others, whether perceptual or descriptive. As a consequence, 
“the more eyes, diff erent eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same 
matter, that much more complete will our ‘concept’ of this matter, our ‘objectivity’ 
be.”³⁸ Objectivity in construction depends upon a wealth of information generated by 
a multiplicity of representations.
Nietzsche and Object Objectivism
There is a pressing objection to reading as a Nietzsche constructivist about objects. 
He appears to believe some objects are unconstructed. With respect to planets, for ex-
ample, one could reply that, while Nietzsche might think we play an essential role in 
deciding that the property of being a planet applies to astronomical object α but not β, 
astronomical objects themselves are perfectly mind-independent. Perhaps Nietzsche 
is an objectivist aft er all.
In response, Nietzsche would likely claim that what holds for the property of be-
ing a planet also holds for the property of being an astronomical object. We construct 
astronomical objects by organizing features of the world that matter to us about some 
celestial entities, associations, or structures having the property of being an astro-
nomical object. For instance, consider star clusters. Star clusters are scattered objects. 
They are composed of dozens to millions of stars. Determining if some aggregate of 
stars is a cluster requires determining what stars, of what kind, distributed over what 
spatial and temporal intervals, constitutes a cluster. Nietzsche would claim that we 
contribute to determining these boundaries just as we do planets. A similar argument 
36 “[D]en Begriff „wirklich, wahrhaft vorhanden“ haben wir erst gezogen aus dem „uns-angehn“” 
(Nachlass 1886/87, 5[19], KSA 12.191 f.).
37 See GM III: 12; A 20; BGE 80, 207; EH, “Books” 5; GS P: 3.
38 “[J]e  m e h r  Augen, verschiedne Augen wir uns für dieselbe Sache einzusetzen wissen, um so 
vollständiger wird unser „Begriff“ dieser Sache, unsre „Objektivität“ sein.” (GM III: 12, translation 
modified).
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can be made about stars themselves. We decide what identifi es certain heavenly ma-
terial as a star. For Nietzsche, there is no ontologically signifi cant diff erence between 
objects we can experience – all are constructed.
Critics reply that constructivist views such as Nietzsche’s are untenable because 
there has to be something upon which construction occurs which is itself not con-
structed:
If our concepts are cutting lines into some basic worldly dough and thus imbuing it with a struc-
ture it would not otherwise possess, doesn’t there have to be some worldly dough for them to get 
to work on, and mustn’t the basic properties of that dough be determined independently of all 
this [constructive] activity?³⁹
At the basic level of reality, we must structure something that has features constitu-
tively independent of our descriptive activities. So, something must have such fea-
tures. Another critic writes: “Whether a feature or predicate of our making is null or 
not is not […] dependent on the saying.”⁴⁰ Some predicates, particularly those fash-
ioned to represent the basic level of reality, have content essentially apart from our ac-
tivities. So, something must have such content. This suggests the following argument:
C1. There must be some unconstructed objects for there to be constructed objects.
C2. If so, then object constructivism is false.
C3. So, object constructivism is false.
C2 is unassailable on the current understanding of object constructivism. C1 is war-
ranted because the material that enables agents to construct objects must have con-
ditions of identity constitutively independent of our descriptions. Whatever has these 
identity conditions is unconstructed. It follows that constructivism is false.
Nietzsche’s best reply would be to deny C1. The objectivist position that some-
thing has the features it does constitutively divorced from our descriptions does not 
help answer questions about what objects exist. And this is the very issue in con-
tention. The claim that a predicate is not null, or has some content apart from us, 
says nothing about what predicate is not null, or what content it has apart from us. 
Moreover, it is self-defeating to describe such content in any detail, since the descrip-
tion would require some organization of the world, which, according to Nietzsche, 
aff ects what objects exist.⁴¹ Objectivists cannot describe what has the features it does 
apart from us without abandoning their position. No content is “given” without being 
“taken” to have some boundaries.
39 Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge, p. 35.
40 Israel Scheffler, Worlds of Truth. A Philosophy of Knowledge, Malden 2009, p. 61.
41 See also Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, p. 6.
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Despite this response, which is available to Nietzsche, one could maintain that 
he still thinks some objects are unconstructed, namely, the fundamental forces upon 
which macroscopic objects are constructed. Of course, even if Nietzsche were an ob-
jectivist about microscopic reality, he could be a constructivist about macroscopic 
objects. This is enough to challenge all prominent secondary readings of Nietzsche’s 
view of objects. However, there may be reason to suppose that Nietzsche is not com-
mitted to objectivism. He appears to treat forces as mereologically simple (i.e. part-
less) units of basic reality.⁴² Since objects appear composite (i.e. have parts), forces 
may not be objects. This argument rests on Nietzsche’s understanding of force. For 
Nietzsche, the fundamental feature of force is directedness: a force is actively oriented 
from some perspective towards some target. His view that forces “will” [Wille] means 
they are actively oriented (Nachlass 1888, 14[79]). A force’s activity is to infl uence 
whatever it encounters, which is then its target (Nachlass 1888, 14[186]). Nietzsche of-
ten discusses a force’s infl uence as “growth” (BGE 230, see also 259), specifi cally “the 
growth of power” [Macht] (Nachlass 1885/86, 2[108]). Growth occurs from a particu-
lar “mode of action,” or perspective (Nachlass 1888, 14[184], see also 1888, 14[186]). 
Nietzsche’s position that a force “wills” “power,” then, means that a force is actively 
oriented towards expanding the infl uence of its perspective.
From this analysis, one might be tempted to conclude that forces are composite. 
Forces seem to have two parts: a perspective and an activity. On Nietzsche’s view, 
however, a force’s activity is ontologically inseparable, though conceptually sep-
arable, from its perspective, just as a subject is ontologically inseparable, though 
conceptually separable, from its actions.⁴³ Forces are indeed mereologically simple. 
Unfortunately, this does not help the constructivist respond to the charge that forces 
are unconstructed. Forces necessarily exist in bundles, or “quanta,” which appear to 
be composed of at least two forces. Bundles of forces are proper candidates for uncon-
structed objects. 
Does Nietzsche think bundles of forces are constructed? Answering this question 
requires introducing Newton’s understanding of force. Of course, Nietzsche does not 
accept all features of classical mechanics. He denies that rigid, extended pieces of 
matter comprise the ultimate units of reality. Instead, he adopts Boscovich’s position 
that materially ungrounded forces are basic.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, classical mechanics pro-
vides a helpful background for assessing Nietzsche’s position on force.
Newton articulates force in mathematical terms. He understands force as mass 
times acceleration:
F = ma = m d2 x/dt2
42 See Nachlass 1888, 14[184]; 1888, 14[79].
43 For this view of force see Nachlass 1888, 14[79]. For this view of the subject see GM I: 13.
44 See BGE 12, 17; Nachlass 1885, 40[36].
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The force acting on a body is equal to its mass times the second derivative of its posi-
tion with respect to time. Ronald Giere, whose work I draw on here, has pointed out 
that the chief importance of Newton’s principles is their application to empirical tar-
gets.⁴⁵ This project requires looking at various formulations of force functions. With 
respect to linear restoring force, for example, the force on a particle is proportional to 
the negative displacement of the particle from its rest position. The second law for this 
is (where k is the constant of proportionality):
F = ma = m d2 x/dt2 = – kx
This enables the representation of harmonic motion. For current purposes, it is not 
essential to go over the details of different force functions, but simply note that one 
must account for two things when applying them to target phenomena. One must inter-
pret mathematical symbols to instantiate some concept, such as position, momentum, 
or mass. One must also identify mathematical symbols with some feature of a specific 
object, such as the mass of the earth. Giere calls the former the requirement inter-
pretation and the latter identification.⁴⁶ He examines F = – kx to illustrate his point. 
Here x could be interpreted as the displacement of a particle from its rest position, 
and in applying the formula to a particular mass on a spring, x could be identified as 
the displacement of a particular mass from its equilibrium position. Giere notes that 
the requirements of interpretation and identification are not unique to mathematical 
representation in Newtonian physics, but occur whenever we attempt to use language 
to represent the world.⁴⁷
Nietzsche appreciates that these requirements – whatever they are called – must 
be met to represent empirical phenomena.⁴⁸ On Nietzsche’s account, meeting such 
requirements implies that mathematical and logical discourse are “a means and 
measure for us to create reality” (Nachlass 1887, 9[97], cf. HH I: 11, 19; GS 111, 121; 
BGE 4, 21). The argument goes as follows.⁴⁹ For the symbols of mathematics and logic 
to mean anything, or be applicable, there must be domains of objects to which they 
refer. These domains, or universes of discourse, are constructed by virtue of a con-
ceptual apparatus. The meaningfulness and applicability of symbols, then, requires 
constructing objects, whether concrete or abstract. Nietzsche refers to mathematical 
and logical objects as “fabricated beings” (HH I: 19). Conceptual frameworks provide 
45 See Ronald Giere, Explaining Science, Chicago 1988, p. 66; cf. Ronald Giere, Scientific Perspectiv-
ism, Chicago 2006, p. 61.
46 Giere, Explaining Science, pp. 74–76; Giere, Scientific Perspectivism, p. 62.
47 Giere, Explaining Science, pp. 75–76; Giere, Scientific Perspectivism, p. 62.
48 See TL; HH I: 11, 19; GS 111, 121; 354; BGE 192, 268; Nachlass 1884, 25[168], 1885/86, 2[87], 1887, 
10[202].
49 This is indebted to Hales / Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, pp. 42–44. See Nachlass 1887, 
9[97]; HH I: 11, 19; GS 111.
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an interpretation and identifi cation of relevant symbols. We construct domains that 
tell us which kinds of things symbols represent (e.g. within domain D = {1, 2, 3, …}, say 
F: {2, 4, 6, …} and H: {<x, y>/ x, y ß D and x > y}) and which particular things symbols 
represent (e.g. in D say a: 1 and b: 2). Interpreting and identifying symbols allows us to 
apply them (e.g., we can determine the truth-values of Haa (false) and Fb & Hba (true) 
in D). For Nietzsche, when we apply conceptual frameworks to interpret and identify 
mathematical and logical syntax we eff ectively “create reality.”
In an instructive passage from the Nachlass, Nietzsche suggests that the type of 
construction required to apply mathematical and logical formulas to target phenom-
ena is also required to apply formulas of force to target phenomena. He fi rst comments 
that “The mathematical physicists have no use for lump atoms in their science; conse-
quently they construct for themselves a world of force-points which can be reckoned 
with.”⁵⁰ Mathematical physicists “construct for themselves a world of force-points,” 
or an ontology of bundles of forces, to avoid problems in material atomistic systems, 
such as Newtonian physics. Other passages suggest that physicists aim to construct 
a scientifi c model that attempts to understand all worldly phenomena as diff erent 
manifestations of interacting bundles of forces.
Consider Beyond Good and Evil 36.⁵¹ Nietzsche famously conjectures, “Suppose 
nothing else were ‘given’ as real except our world of desires and passions, and we 
could not get down, or up, to any other ‘reality’ besides the reality of our drives.” 
This “primitive form of the world” consisting in only “drives” suggests a project: “[I]s 
it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this ‘given’ 
would not be suffi  cient to render the so-called mechanistic (and thus material) world 
comprehensible as well?” (translation modifi ed). And this experiment is not optional: 
“not only is it permitted to make the experiment; conscience of method demands it.” 
Nietzsche then expands on the connection between eff ective drives and effi  cient cau-
sality:
The question is in the end whether we really recognize the will as efficient, whether we believe 
in the causality of the will: if we do […] then we have to make the experiment of positing the 
causality of the will hypothetically as the only one […] In short one has to risk the hypothesis 
whether will does not affect will wherever “effects” are recognized – and whether all mechanical 
occurrences are not, insofar as a force is active in them, will force, effects of the will.
50 “Die mathematischen Physiker können die Klümpchen-Atome nicht für ihre Wissenschaft brau-
chen: folglich construiren sie sich eine Kraft-Punkte-Welt, mit der man rechnen kann.” (Nachlass 
1885, 40[36], KSA 11.646).
51 The aim of this passage is certainly not uncontroversial. For arguments that it does not put for-
ward Nietzsche’s view about the fundamental nature of reality see Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and 
Philosophy, Ch. 7; Clark / Dudrick, The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, Ch. 8. For responses 
see Anderson, Overcoming Charity; and Hales / Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, pp. 102–107. For 
the view that Nietzsche wants us to take his fundamental ontology seriously see Richard Schacht, 
Nietzsche’s Will to Power, in: International Studies in Philosophy 32.3 (2000), pp. 83–94.
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He concludes with a statement about will to power as the only effi  cient causal force:
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and 
ramification of one basic form of the will – namely, of the will to power, as my proposition has it; 
suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power […] then one would have 
gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as – will to power. The world viewed 
from inside, defined and determined according to its “intelligible character” – it would be “will 
to power” and nothing else.
The initial hypothesis – that “we could not get down, or up, to any other “reality” 
besides the reality of our drive” – is a claim about psychology. Psychology posits the 
reality of “willed” drives. Drives “will” because they are psychological forces capable 
of motivating behavior. The passage proposes that if a willed drive event can be un-
derstood as an instance of an effi  cient causal event conceived as will to power, then, 
aft er generalizing into other domains, from the organic to the inorganic, all effi  cient 
causal events might be justifi ably modeled as will to power.
Rex Welshon has pointed out that a willed drive event might be taken as an in-
stance of a causal event conceived as will to power because they enjoy isomorphic 
structures.⁵² A willed drive event, or, more generally, an intentional psychological 
event, consists in a subject, an intentional object, and an aff ective attitude relating 
subject to object.⁵³ For instance, if S enjoys modern dance, then S is the subject, mod-
ern dance is the intentional object, and enjoying is the aff ective attitude. The structure 
of such an event can be modeled as <subject → aff ect → intentional object>. It is an 
aff ective directed transfer of energy from subject to intentional object. A non-psychic 
event modeled as will to power has the form <event α → energy γ → event β>, where 
α and β are particular bundles of forces, and є is a directed energy transfer between 
relata α and β due to the infl uence of α onto β.⁵⁴ A will to power event consists in force 
transferring from one bundle to another. The triadic structure of a causal event con-
ceived as will to power is isomorphic to the structure of an intentional psychological 
event. The isomorphism between these events provides reason to think the latter is 
an instance of the former. If his instantiation extends to events beyond the domain 
of psychology, Nietzsche suggests, eventually we should be permitted to conclude 
that all effi  cient causal events are most basically due to the operation of interacting 
bundles of forces. He requests that we experiment with this generalization. The will 
to power model should help explain all empirical phenomena.
In the Nachlass passage cited above, Nietzsche also indicates that the will to 
power model is determinate only in relation to our contributions: “The mathemati-
cal physicists […] construct for themselves a world of force-points which can be reck-
52 Rex Welshon, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, Montreal / Kingston 2004, pp. 172–176.
53 I will bracket the fact that in willed drive events subjects often recognize intentional objects.
54 See Welshon, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 174.
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oned with […] [T]hey have arranged, thought, devised the world to fi t, until they could 
make use of it” (Nachlass 1885, 40[36]). By “constructing” a “world of force-points,” 
physicists have “arranged” and “devised the world to fi t.” The world as will to power 
itself is apparently “arranged,” “devised,” or “constructed.” This enables physicists to 
“reckon with” and “make use” of the world. Physicists must render the world determi-
nate in order to understand it.
Rendering the will to power model determinate seems to be a consequence of the 
requirements of having to interpret and identify mathematical syntax when applying 
force formulas to various targets. In the passage at issue, for instance, Nietzsche is 
concerned with “mathematical physicists.” Elsewhere he says, “our knowledge has 
become scientifi c to the degree that it can apply number and measure” (Nachlass 
1888, 14[105]). He qualifi es this in The Gay Science: “Let us introduce the subtlety 
and rigor of mathematics into all science to the extent to which that is at all possible; 
not in the belief that we will come to know things this way, but in order to ascertain 
our human relation to things” (GS 246). Insofar as possible, the sciences should be 
informed by mathematics. Yet, because applying mathematics to target phenomena 
requires some human contribution, we should not think that our sciences reveal the 
way the world is apart from all human infl uence.⁵⁵ Thus, if Nietzsche holds that solv-
ing the problems of interpretation and identifi cation contributes to “creating reality,” 
then he might think that physicists render the will to power model determinate by 
interpreting and identifying the symbols within that model (<α → є → β>).
The worry with this interpretation is that Nietzsche never formulates his con-
ception of force quantitatively. He does not provide a mathematical formula for the 
application of the will to power model to target phenomena. Newton’s formulation 
is unavailable to him because it defi nes force in terms of material substance. And, 
although he accepts Boscovich’s idea that forces are materially ungrounded, he does 
not endorse Boscovich’s particular law of force. Boscovich treats forces as qualita-
tively identical, or homogenous, whereas Nietzsche considers forces to be perspecti-
val. Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s recognition that the requirements of interpretation and 
identifi cation must be satisfi ed to represent the world meaningfully can help illumi-
nate why he believes that scientists render the will to power model determinate with-
out having to invoke a particular mathematical formula.
The application of the will to power model to various observational targets fi rst 
requires interpreting α and β as pertaining to some kind of event. A conceptual appa-
ratus must provide an interpretation of α and β such that these symbols have mean-
ingful content. They must be interpreted as some kinds of bundles of forces. This 
55 One might read the passage differently. When Nietzsche says that we will not “come to know things 
this way” he could mean that we cannot have any knowledge of mathematically understood phenom-
ena. However, the reason for this would be that he thinks mathematics and logic are means for us to 
construct realty. Mathematics and logic do not reveal the way the world is apart from us.
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guides us from symbols to objects in a domain by providing information about which 
targets, with which sorts of identity conditions, symbols represent. Interpreting sym-
bols help us identify which specifi c events out of a plurality we identify as α and β. 
Our conceptual apparatus then helps us identify which bundle of forces within a do-
main our kind terms denote. Applying an interpretation of α and β to a target requires 
identifying them with specifi c sets of forces. Only by interpreting and identifying α 
and β can we understand some event as an event of will to power. Nietzsche’s sug-
gestion that physicists render the will to power model determinate seems to mean 
that our judgments delimit the relevant kind and particular domains of α and β. This 
implies that the identity conditions of particular bundles of forces are essentially de-
pendent on our actions. Nietzsche states, “There is no event in itself. What happens is 
a group of phenomena selected and unifi ed by an interpreting being.”⁵⁶ There are no 
events in themselves, or fully apart from our mode of cognition, because the identity 
conditions of events depend on our organizing activities.⁵⁷
One may be tempted to say that, on Nietzsche’s account, forces have the fea-
tures they do divorced from our actions. But this would be incorrect. Forces have the 
property of directedness. They are actively oriented from a perspective towards some 
target outcome to increase infl uence. The kind of perspective from which forces are 
oriented, and the particular extent of their infl uence, are shaped by interpretation 
and identifi cation. Nietzsche asserts, “an artifi cial distinction is made in respect of 
events between that which acts and that toward which the act is directed” (Nachlass 
1887, 9[144]). The conditions delimited are “artifi cial” in the sense that they do not 
exist apart from our interventions. All kind concepts introduce conditions of identity. 
We establish the boundaries of the concepts that defi ne directedness – perspective 
and activity – and those boundaries form the application conditions of the property 
of directedness. The identity conditions of forces, then, appear to depend essentially 
on our activities.
At this point, it is important to reiterate Nietzsche’s anticipated response to the 
objectivist claim that there must be something upon which construction occurs which 
is itself not constructed. With respect to whatever is unconstructed, one can say, at 
most, “something has the features it does apart from our descriptions,” or off er the 
demonstrative “that has the features it does independently of our representational 
56 “Es giebt kein Ereigniß an sich. Was geschieht, ist eine Gruppe von Erscheinungen  a u s g e  l e -
s e n   und zusammengefaßt von einem interpretirenden Wesen.” (Nachlass 1885/86, 1[115], KSA 12.38)
57 One might claim that this account is problematic because we are unable to apprehend forces by 
the senses. This difficulty is not unique to Nietzsche, but also applies to Newtonian and Boscovichian 
forces. Yet, Nietzsche suggests that talk of unobservable objects, such as forces, is meaningful (see 
BGE 12). Nietzsche seems to think that solid evidence of the existence of forces will be born out by 
empirical research.
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activities,” which says nothing about what objects there are.⁵⁸ For Nietzsche, “making 
use” and “reckoning with” the world requires constructing objects, whether macro-
scopic or microscopic (Nachlass 1885, 40[36]). Nietzsche can concede the objectivist 
criticism that constructing objects is only possible provided that something enables 
construction. It does not follow from this that what enables construction are objects. 
The objectivist’s worry is therefore compatible with embracing the constructivist the-
sis that all objects that we can encounter are constructed.
What about noumenal objects, or objects that are in principle inaccessible to hu-
man beings? These objects – if they exist – are the best candidates for unconstructed 
objects. Of course, the existence of noumenal objects does not directly challenge 
constructivism. Constructivism only concerns objects that are in principle accessible. 
Nonetheless, Nietzsche sometimes claims that noumenal objects do not exist. He re-
marks, for instance, “There are no things in themselves! […] Something that is of no 
concern to anyone is not at all” (Nachlass 1885/86, 2[154], see also 1887, 8[2], 1887/88, 
11[99], 10[202], cf. GM III: 12; TI “World” 6). The argument can be stated as follows:⁵⁹
D1. Noumenal objects are in principle inaccessible to us.
D2. If so, then noumenal objects cannot be conceived, or cannot be conceived without 
contradiction.
D3. If something cannot be conceived, or cannot be conceived without contradiction, 
then it does not exist.
D4. So, noumenal objects do not exist.
D1 is the definition of a noumenal object. D2 gains warrant because it seems best to 
understand a noumenal object as a conceptual placeholder for whatever it is that 
exists independently of our particular mode of cognition. We can have no concep-
tion, or only a contradictory conception, of a concept about something we cannot in 
principle conceive.⁶⁰ D3 holds that if something cannot be conceived, or cannot be 
conceived without contradiction, then it does not exist. This assumes inconceivability 
is a good test for ontological impossibility. The assumption is certainly not true in all 
cases. But it does seem warranted in the case of noumenal objects. The inability to 
conceive of something that can only be understood as a concept, or the inability to 
58 For a defense of this position see David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance, Harvard 1980. Wiggins 
holds that “behind every true identity there is an identity sentence covered by a substance concept for 
some particular kind of thing” (p. v). Cf. Michael Devitt, Making Worldmaking Hard: Rejecting Global 
Response Dependency, in: Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (2006), pp. 3–25, here p. 13: “You do not 
get a realism [viz., object objectivism] worth fighting for by claiming merely that something exists 
objectively and independently of the mental.”
59 This reconstruction is indebted to Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, pp. 83–85, and Leiter, 
Nietzsche on Morality, pp. 19–20.
60 See GM III: 12; BGE 16; GS 54.
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conceive of something that can only be understood as a concept without contradic-
tion, indicates that it does not exist. It follows that noumenal objects do not exist. 
This argument, combined with commitment to constructivism about the objects of 
experience, implies that for Nietzsche all objects are constructed.
Object Constructivism and Nihilism
I want to fi nish by suggesting why Nietzsche might have been attracted to such a 
radical Kantian view of objects. My account is meant to begin to bridge the gap be-
tween the treatment of Nietzsche’s metaphysics and ethics in secondary literature. 
It is common to focus on Nietzsche’s metaphysics and neglect his ethical concerns, 
particularly his worries about nihilism. Moreover, focusing on his ethics oft en leaves 
little place for his metaphysics. One way to combine these two approaches is to grant 
that Nietzsche is primarily concerned with ethical issues, specifi cally nihilism, and to 
investigate his metaphysics in the context of his ethics. I adopt this methodology in 
what follows.
Nietzsche’s mature work is primarily concerned with understanding nihilism. 
Nihilism is the view that life is meaningless. For Nietzsche, life is meaningless be-
cause the highest values people have used to comprehend it have become deval-
ued.⁶¹ These values have become devalued because they cannot be realized in the 
conditions of this world.⁶² On Nietzsche’s view, the “true world of being” is a critical 
nihilistic value.⁶³ The true world of being is a world conceived to be constitutively in-
dependent of the empirical world. It is obvious that throughout history the true world 
has been dominant in shaping people’s lives and informing basic assumptions about 
the relationship between mind and world. In philosophical and scientifi c inquiry, for 
instance, people have traditionally understood themselves to be grasping objects con-
stitutively independent of human interpretation, motivated by the value that the best 
theories should represent such objects. However, the truth of constructivism renders 
this value unrealizable. Embracing constructivism, then, contributes to overcoming 
nihilism. Constructivism helps people recognize that they have “absolutely no right” 
to certain values (Nachlass 1887/88, 11[99]). Thus, recognizing the truth of construc-
tivism could add meaning to people’s lives. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche explains:
It is we, the thinking-sensing ones, who really and continually make something that is not yet 
there: the whole perpetually growing world of valuations, colors, weights, perspectives, scales, 
affirmations, and negations. This poem that we have invented is constantly internalized, drilled,
61 See Nachlass 1887, 9[35], cf. 1886/87, 5[71]; A 1.
62 See Nachlass 1887/88, 11[61], 1887, 9[60], 1888, 14[9]. See Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, pp. 25–28.
63 See Nachlass 1887/88, 11[99]; cf. TI, “Reason” 6.
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translated into flesh and reality, indeed, into the commonplace, by the so-called practical human 
beings […] we have created the world that concerns human beings! But precisely this knowledge 
we lack, and when we catch it for a moment we have forgotten it the next: we misjudge our best 
power and underestimate ourselves just a bit, we contemplative ones. We are neither as proud nor 
as happy as we could be (GS 301, cf. HH I: 16).
Reality is constructed. Yet, since we are largely unaware of it, “we are neither as proud 
nor as happy as we could be.”⁶⁴
Commitment to constructivism could also ease the distress that follows the 
awareness that the true world has become devalued. Nietzsche writes:
Nihilism as a psychological state will have to be reached, first, when we have sought a “meaning” 
in all events that is not there: so the seeker eventually becomes discouraged. Nihilism, then, is 
the recognition of the long waste of strength, the agony of the “in vain,” insecurity, the lack 
of any opportunity to recover and regain composure – being ashamed in front of oneself, as if 
one had deceived oneself all too long […] any goal at least constitutes some meaning (Nachlass 
1887/88, 11[99]).
One infl uential “meaning” or “goal” of philosophical and scientifi c inquiry is uncov-
ering mind-independent objects. This aim is a “waste of strength,” a project under-
taken “in vain.” It rests on a deception. 
However, inquiry is not a “waste of strength” or “in vain” if we recognize that 
objects are constructed. For Nietzsche, “we can comprehend only a world that we 
ourselves have made” (Nachlass 1884, 25[470], cf. GS 301). He remarks, “A nihilist is 
a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it 
ought to be that it does not exist” (Nachlass 1887, 9[60]). Constructivists affi  rm reality 
as it is, whereas objectivists, whether or not they are aware of it, hold that the way the 
world is ought not to be. Embracing constructivism, then, enables people to commit 
to the goal of understanding the world without deceiving themselves about the nature 
of the objects of inquiry. As a result, endorsing constructivism can enhance meaning 
in many cognitive pursuits. Perhaps Nietzsche was attracted to constructivism about 
objects, then, to combat his greatest philosophical concern.
64 It has been argued that nihilism is most basically an affective state, rather than a cognitive aware-
ness of the nature of our values or the world. See Ken Gemes, Nihilism and the Affirmation of Life: 
A Review of and Dialogue with Bernard Reginster, in: European Journal of Philosophy 16.3 (2008), 
pp. 459–466. My account can be understood as providing a necessary but not sufficient description 
of what constitutes nihilism. But it is important not to lose sight of the importance of the cognitive 
dimension of nihilism. After all, Nietzsche claims that a particular cognitive recognition – the recog-
nition that “all the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world estimable for 
ourselves” have “proved inapplicable” and “therefore devaluated the world” – provides the means by 
which to no longer devalue the world (Nachlass 1887/88, 11[99]).
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